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This paper aims to foreground some of the main ways in which issues of social welfare and 
social policy came to occupy centre stage in the Scottish Independence Debate during 
recent years, culminating in the September 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. It 
considers how issues relating to social welfare and the future of the welfare state more 
generally were advanced by the pro-Scottish Independence YES camp as key arguments in 
the overall case for Independence. This then disputes suggestions to the contrary that the 
pro-YES movement was a campaign driven primarily by issues of Scottish nationalism and 
national identity. Instead issues of social welfare, social justice and the creation of a more 
equal Scotland dominated. 
The paper considers the key social policy issues that emerged before and during the 
Independence Referendum, and in particular focuses on the ways in which these were also 
entangled with the wider question of the future constitutional direction of Scotland. In 
discussing the fall-out and consequences of the NO vote, the paper also highlights the 
continuing ways in which social welfare issues have remained central to ongoing debates 
around the devolution of further powers to Scotland, plans for which are having huge 
repercussions for the future not only of Scotland, but of the entire UK. 
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Introduction: The Political and Policy Context 
The Scottish Independence Referendum of September 18, 2014, will be recognised by 
future generations as a historic moment in the history of the United Kingdom. For a number 
of commentators and observers, despite the majority NO to Independence vote, the future of 
the UK looks less secure now that it did in the months leading up to the Referendum itself.  
The Scottish Independence Referendum reminds us once again that the UK is far from being 
the unified entity that is often presented to the outside world, not least by the UK 
Government. But this misunderstands the nature of the UK: as a union state/states of union: 
a multinational union of different nations (a pluri-national state consisting of more than one 
country and one nation), coming together at different points in history, sometimes in ways 
that were uneasy and tense. The history of what we might term the coming-togetherness of 
different parts of these islands to form the UK matters immensely to where we find ourselves 
now – and to the many tensions that exist between these component countries – and of 
course often within them too. The enduring history of the UK’s turbulent past works to shape 
the present and the future:  
Nobody asked to design a political system for Britain would ever propose the one it 
has. The one-and-a-bit large islands (and many smaller ones) that The Economist 
calls home are a hotchpotch of parliamentary systems, unevenly distributed powers 
and constitutional uncertainties. The set-up is as uneven as Britain’s history is 
eventful, which is no coincidence: the causes of the mess date back centuries. The 
latest upheaval - Scotland’s referendum on independence, which ended with a “no” 
vote on September 18 - has made things untidier still. (The Economist, September 
27, 2014). 
The Scottish Independence Referendum represents the latest stage in the evolving story of 
the political and constitutional shape of the UK. However, and while this may also apply to 
some within Scotland, the external view of the Scottish Independence Referendum, and the 
issues that drove the demand for such a ballot, have largely been misunderstood and 
misinterpreted. For many observers this was a nationalist issue; an issue of national identity, 
of movement for national liberation of some vague kind. In the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
and other Scottish nationalists, of course, this is very much the case. Here there has been a 
long-cherished belief in and commitment to the goal of Scottish self-determination, based on 
the mythical but widely held view that Scotland has historically been an oppressed nation, 
unfairly controlled by England and by membership of the UK union.  
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However, to make a jump from recognising the SNPs long-held ambitions in this regard, to 
interpreting the entire pro-independence YES campaign and wider independence movement 
as nationalist in this sense would be mistaken and indeed would lead to a mis-understanding 
of the issues that drove the YES vote and which now, in the months following the September 
2014 Referendum, are continuing to unsettle Scotland – as well as other parts of the UK, 
and the leaders of the main UK political parties too. 
Scottish nationalist sentiments and ambitions, to the extent that they did play a part in the 
pro-independence campaign, were centrally interconnected with other issues that cannot be 
seen in any simple sense as being ‘nationalist’, no matter how that might be understood or 
defined. Core to the entire campaign for Scottish Independence – and this was crucial in 
shaping the debate that took place since March 2013 when the date of the 2014 
Referendum was first announced by Scottish First Minister, Alex Salmond, culminating of 
course on the September 18, 2014 ballot – were what might be broadly termed social 
welfare and social justice issues, even if there is continuing ambiguity and contestation 
around the meaning and politics of the idea of social justice itself (Mooney, 2014a). 
There was considerable interest in the Scottish Independence debate and Referendum 
outside of the UK and Ireland. In Spain, in Catalonia and in the Basque Country, in Belgium 
and in Quebec, among other places, nationalist movements looked to developments in 
Scotland for support and inspiration. In other respects, there are wider parallels to the 
debates in Scotland, as demands for constitutional and territorial reform have become 
prevalent across parts of Europe and North Americas in the last two decades.  Studies in 
Germany, Spain, Nordic countries, Belgium, Ireland and Canada, for example, offer lessons, 
but also show that careful and critical analysis is needed, rather than simple notions of policy 
transfer (Scott, 2014). 
In this paper, for reasons of space, we seek primarily to lay out experiences and reflections 
from the Scottish Independence debate and the 2014 Referendum to inform future wider 
comparative studies. 
Scottish Devolution and Social Welfare 
While many academics and observers have focused primarily on post-devolution policy-
divergences, historically, long predating any discussion of devolution, there were already 
considerable policy and practice differences and divergences between Scotland and the 
three other countries of the UK, not least in relation to education and law/policing. From the 
very beginning of Scotland’s devolution journey in 1999, however, questions of how to 
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enhance social justice were at centre stage. The first First Minister, the late Donald Dewar, 
for example, stated that (on the re-establishment of the first devolved Scottish Parliament): 
We are committed to promoting social justice and equality of opportunity for everyone 
in Scotland... we can build on the commitment to social justice which lies at the heart 
of political and civic life in Scotland. We need to harness the efforts of many to the 
greater good of all, and establish social justice as the hallmark of Scottish society. 
(Dewar, 1999) 
Fourteen years later politicians on both sides of the Independence debate claimed social 
justice was a defining feature of Scotland’s future. Gordon Brown (2014a), who was to play a 
key part in the NO to independence campaign in the week before the September 2014 
Referendum, argued that social justice lies at the heart of Scottish political values but 
commended the current union as ‘a union of social justice’.  By contrast, the SNP controlled 
Scottish Government’s vision for Independence, Scotland’s Future: your guide to an 
Independent Scotland, published in November 2013, asserted the centrality of social justice, 
but within the context of an independent Scottish state:   
The Scottish Government’s vision is of a Scotland, fit for the 21st century and 
beyond, which is founded on the fundamental principles of equality and human rights 
and characterised by our economic success and social justice and the ability of our 
people to have control over the decisions which affect them: the opportunity for all 
Scotland’s people to play a part in our future. (Nicola Sturgeon, Deputy First Minister, 
Scottish Government, 2013) 
Social justice and a more equitable form of social welfare, have frequently appeared as an 
essential part of Scottish political rhetoric, a rhetoric which has continuously claimed that 
social justice goals would be more effectively met by a devolved (but with more policy 
powers) government or, more latterly, an independent Scottish government. The claims are 
at the heart of long-standing and on-going controversies about the nature of Scottish society 
– and of Scottish identity, indeed of ‘Scottishness’ itself (Mooney and Scott, 2012). They also 
show that despite changes in the political colour of the Scottish government, from Labour-
Liberal Democrat Coalition between 1999 and 2007 and SNP since 2007, notions of social 
justice, together with related ideas of fairness and equality, play a central role in Scottish 
political debate and in the rhetoric of policy making. Claims for social justice, moreover, have 
become increasingly intertwined with the Independence/ Devolution debates – by both sides 
– though overwhelmingly by the YES side of the argument.  
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Markedly different responses, for example, to the financial crisis of 2008 by Westminster and 
Holyrood governments highlight sharply contrasting approaches to social welfare between 
Scotland and across the UK (Bell, 2010). The Scottish Parliament has disputed and criticised 
UK Government welfare policies continuously since the start of the ‘austerity cuts’ introduced 
by the Coalition Government, and took the unprecedented step in December 2011, of 
withholding ‘consent’ from the Westminster Welfare Reform Bill. The automatic support of 
the Scottish Parliament would normally have been expected for the implementation of such 
measures in Scotland. 
The questioning of the policy direction of Westminster, moreover, became more explicit 
during the two years prior to the 2014 Referendum. It raised the profile of social welfare in 
political debate in Scotland to unprecedented levels, and as we review what this means for 
the future we have to recognise that constitutional matters, territorial issues, questions of 
national identity and social policy have become strongly intertwined and almost inseparable 
in the current Scottish political context and in the debates around what future powers may be 
devolved to Scotland following the report of the Smith Commission in November 2014.  
 
The UK Welfare State: Towards Increasing Fragmentation? 
We need to ask at this point whether the political debate highlighted above has produced 
real differences in the welfare directions of the UK and Scotland. In Scotland this has often 
been articulated in terms of a commitment to what is seen as a uniquely ‘Scottish’ form and 
understanding of social democracy, indeed an uniquely Scottish social democracy (Keating, 
2007). The flagship policy decisions of Scottish Government since the early years of 
devolution have included free prescriptions for all, abolition of fees for higher education 
students resident in Scotland, free travel for the over 60s, and free care for the elderly. They 
all highlight a growing and deliberate divide between the policies of Scotland and the rest of 
the UK (Keating, 2010; Greer, 2009; McLean, Gallagher, and Lodge, 2013; Mooney and 
Scott, 2012; Mooney and Wright, 2009). 
Since 1999 then, Scottish Government policies have sought to demonstrate to Scottish 
voters that devolved administrations could make a difference, but under current SNP control, 
to also show that it could withstand the austerity cuts and welfare reforms of the UK 
Government, thereby in some ways reducing their impacts on Scotland (Haydecker, 2010; 
Lodge and Schmueker, 2010; Mooney, 2014b; Mooney and Scott, 2012). 
That welfare issues have become even more entangled with constitutional debates and 
questions of national futures today is not surprising. Social welfare was central to 
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discussions in the post-1945 era of Britishness and of the UK itself. UK wide institutions such 
as the NHS and social security have long been held up as pivotal elements in the Union, a 
union which in many respects has been a ‘welfare union’. There is a powerful narrative that 
the historical development of the welfare state in post-1945 Britain played an important role 
in binding the UK together, forging Britain as a nation. This has now being been deployed in 
the advancement of the case for Independence for Scotland from that very union. It is the 
very institutional embodiment of post-war Britishness which is seen to have been eroded in 
recent decades. The argument is that this erosion comes not from the SNP, but from 
successive UK Governments which have pursued policies of welfare ‘reform’, cuts and 
privatisation, all of which have contributed – alongside devolution – to a sharply declining 
sense of a unified or UK-wide welfare state and consequently an erosion in a sense of 
Britishness. The ultimate irony, in a Referendum that has thrown up many ironies, as we will 
see below, is that 45% of Scottish voters supported withdrawal from the UK union in the 
hope that in doing so they would in some sense hold onto one of the principle institutional 
signifiers of post-1945 Britishness, the UK welfare state! 
It is this background that many cite, including leading Scottish nationalist politicians such as 
Alex Salmond, and new First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, when they argue that Independence 
for Scotland is not just about changing the constitutional settlement, but also about 
‘preserving’ in some ways the founding principles of the post-‘45 UK welfare state in 
Scotland, at a time when the UK Coalition Government is diverging more and more from 
Beveridgean ideals of large-scale state welfare provision (Mooney 2014b; Scott & Wright 
2012; Brown, 2014a). For Salmond, Scotland could act as a ‘beacon’ to the rest of the UK in 
this regard. 
Nicola McEwen argues that this co-existence of a critique of UK welfare change and the 
independence debate has been a striking development in Scotland since 2011. She claims 
that: 
The welfare state is being used to bolster support for independence in the current 
debate, in attempts to underline Scotland’s distinctive values, to diminish the appeal of 
the Anglo-Scottish political union, and portray a picture of an independent Scotland 
that would preserve the rights of social citizenship. (McEwen, 2013) 
In this respect divergences in social welfare as well as in claims for transfers of more power 
to Scotland are not unique (Keating, 2010; McLean et al, 2013). Indeed Beland and Lecours 
(2008) study of nationalism and social policy in Scotland, Quebec and Flanders highlight, 
like McEwen, the importance of social policy as an instrument of territorial differentiation in 
struggles over political autonomy.  
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In fact the political and policy landscape of contemporary Scotland has been increasingly 
shaped by resistance, both at a Government level and on the ground, to social welfare and 
‘austerity’ policy objectives of the UK Coalition Government. The Scottish Government’s 
decision, following widespread popular campaigns, to provide funds to ameliorate the effects 
of one of the UK Government’s welfare key welfare reform measures, the ‘abolition of the 
spare room subsidy’ (widely referred to as the ‘bedroom tax’), for example, came to 
prominence not only as a mark of the continuing challenges of policy interdependence which 
existed in the pre-Independence Referendum era of devolution (housing being devolved and 
housing benefits being a reserved power), but also as symbolic of growing political 
difference between UK and Scottish Governments, and between the policy climate in 
Scotland and England. It became  and as a way of advocating the distinctiveness of Scottish 
values and approaches.  
In this context the September 2014 Referendum offered an opportunity for many in both the 
YES and NO camps to highlight the potential for a Scottish political settlement that further 
resisted the neo-liberal direction of social and economic policy that has come to characterise 
what in Scotland has been, and remains, a deeply unpopular Conservative-led UK 
Government. Arguing for expanding the powers of devolution – for a ‘devo-plus’ (a few more 
powers to Scotland), ‘devo-max’ (maximum devolution of powers but Scotland remains 
within the UK) or the full Independence solution – became an important route for resisting 
UK Government austerity policies and welfare ‘reforms’. At a time when it appears that the 
main Westminster parties in the UK see the answer to economic crisis as being more cuts 
and austerity, as in December 2014, and perhaps renegotiating membership of the EU, the 
political climate in Scotland is remarkably different.  
The YES Campaign as a Social Justice Movement 
The SNP were clearly to the fore in the YES campaign, and 53% of all YES voters had 
previously voted SNP in Scottish and or UK elections. This meant that the, albeit diluted and 
at times nationalist overtones of the YES campaign worked to perhaps slightly marginalise 
other groups within the YES campaign. However, the overwhelming majority of the 1.6 
million people voting for Independence were not SNP members and could not be considered 
as Scottish nationalists of any kind. This was not a pro-Nationalist vote. The media, not least 
the media based in England (and at times in Scotland too), have sought to portray this very 
much in terms of Scottish Nationalism, as some kind of movement for national liberation. 
This is to seriously misunderstand the nature of the YES/Pro-Independence movement.  
The mobilisation in the YES campaign of tens of thousands of active supporters, way 
beyond the then membership of the SNP alone, testifies that the YES campaign had a very 
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broad reach – and in particular among the young. Further, the main issues driving the YES 
vote, as Lord Ashcroft’s immediate post-referendum snap poll of 2,000 voters showed, were 
not ‘nationalist’ ones, but were firstly, ‘disaffection with Westminster politics’, that 
Westminster was increasingly out of touch with the needs of Scotland, not least that the UK 
Government did not have any mandate from Scottish voters and that Labour was 
increasingly alienating its heartlands as it sought support from voters in ‘middle England’.  
Secondly, there was a question about the future of the National Health Service (NHS) and in 
particular concerns that the NHS in Scotland would follow that in England and become 
increasingly privatised. In turn these fears around the NHS acted as a vehicle for mobilising 
other concerns about cuts in public and social services and UK Government austerity 
measures more generally.  
Further evidence from the 2014 Scottish Social Attitude Survey shows that it was 
expectations of how the Scottish economy would perform in an Independence context that 
was the key factor in support or opposition to Independence. Alongside this issues of 
equality and social inequality also influenced the voting intentions of a growing number of 
voters in Scotland and the great majority of those thinking that income inequalities would be 
lower in an Independent Scotland supported Independence (ScotCen Social Research, 
2014; Eichhorn and Frommholz, 2014). 
The wider YES campaign, then, acted as a conduit for a range of discontents over issues 
such as the impact of austerity, the rejection of nuclear weapons (especially to the location 
of the UK’s nuclear submarine fleet in Scottish waters), environmental issues and also anti-
privatisation. This is evidenced not least by the range of groups and other parties (For 
instance the Scottish Greens and Scottish Socialist Party) that came together in the wider 
YES movement – a movement that went far beyond the SNP itself. The success of 
community-centred campaigns against the ‘Bedroom Tax’ in Scotland over the previous year 
also lent much energy to the YES campaign, an energy not seen since the era of campaigns 
against the poll-tax in the late 1980s. However, given that the broad-appeal of the YES 
campaign spanned many disparate groups and sections of the population, it would be 
mistaken to suggest that all shared a same commitment to social justice issues. There were 
of course strong demands for self-determination – irrespective of the shape and policies of 
any forthcoming independent Scottish Government. Nevertheless many were registering 
protest against ‘Westminster’ and there were numerous claims about defending the welfare 
state. However, in different ways, some of the various groupings within the YES movement 
were also offering visions that went beyond defending existing provision and this included, 
among other arguments, proposals for a Nordic-type welfare regime and a Scottish welfare 
state that was organised on a radically different kind of economy from that which 
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characterises the neo-liberal UK today. In this regard social welfare proposals, and claims 
that better funding and greatly enhanced provision of public services, would be a feature of 
an Independent Scotland built upon principles of social justice. 
The September 2014 Referendum: Themes, Issues and Consequences 
The Scottish Independence Referendum, held on Thursday September 18, 2014, produced 
a turnout of around 85%. Therefore, the vast majority of the voting population was politically 
mobilised in the wider constitutional/future of the country debate. As is now well known, the 
Referendum resulted in a majority NO to Independence vote, with 55 per cent of voters 
registering NO to Independence and 45 per cent voting YES. While there is no doubt that the 
NO campaign won overall, that some 1.6m people voted for Scottish Independence is truly 
astonishing. Few would have predicted a 45% vote in favour of YES for Scottish 
Independence during most of the two years of the Referendum campaign where the NO side 
was well in front. Many voters aged 40 and over grew up in an era when the SNP were 
widely considered to be a group of nationalist extremists on the margins. Not now. In part 
this could be because the YES campaign, while not completely marginalising national/ist 
issues, focused almost entirely on social welfare related issues and opposition to neo-
liberalism, to austerity and cuts. In this respect alone the YES campaign could be regarded 
as being highly successful and it was stopped in no small part by the intervention of the UK 
state, media and the three main UK party leaders hastily making the ‘vow’ we highlight below 
in the days before the Referendum itself, promising to give more powers to Scotland. 
  
However, these are not the only factors that helped to secure a NO vote. Importantly, the NO 
campaign was also successful in focusing upon ‘bread and butter’ issues in the last week of 
the campaign. They raised fears, well-grounded fears it must be said, about jobs moving 
South to England; prices of food items and other costs increasing; uncertainty around 
Scotland’s future under Independence over currency and its ability to be part of a monetary 
union with the rest of the UK, thereby undermining living standards and pensions. The YES 
campaign struggled to address these claims. Had the YES campaign been able to 
satisfactorily answer these issues, and defuse fears around economic issues, the likelihood 
is that it would have won the Referendum. 
 
Other features of the Independence Referendum result are also noteworthy. In particular this 
is reflected in the political geography of voting patterns across Scotland’s 32 council districts. 
It was apparent in the early hours of Friday morning September 19 that the income deprived 
areas were voting YES in large numbers. The four areas with a majority YES vote, Dundee, 
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Glasgow City and its two neighbouring Clydeside areas, West Dunbartonshire to the West 
and North Lanarkshire to its immediate East, contain the most deprived areas in Scotland. In 
areas with a marginal NO vote (of between less than 1% and 3%), Inverclyde (Centred on 
the towns of Greenock, Gourock and Port Glasgow to the West of Glasgow), North Ayrshire, 
which is based around Irvine New Town (the largest part), the Garnock Valley (Kilbirnie, 
Dalry, etc.), East Ayrshire (Kilmarnock and surrounding areas), and in Renfrewshire (centred 
on Paisley which also returned a YES vote), there was a clear split between areas of poverty 
and (relative and absolute) affluence.  
In general terms it is apparent that the more affluent the area, the more likely it was to vote 
NO. Scotland’s four main cities produced contrasting results: Dundee and Glasgow returned 
a YES vote, for example, while Aberdeen and Edinburgh voted NO. In some areas there was 
a split between town and countryside, for instance in Inverclyde and Renfrewshire, in the 
West of Scotland, the main towns were for YES, while rural parts voted NO, while in the 
Highlands, Inverness town was for YES, but most of the rural Highlands voted NO. But this 
was by no means a uniform pattern across the entire country. This highlights a complex and 
uneven intra-regional political geography of contemporary Scotland, which itself reflects the 
fractured and divided nature of Scottish society. The relationship between these uneven 
geographies in voting and issues of social welfare requires more investigation and analysis. 
While social welfare issues were a key fault line in the wider constitutional debate, it was 
only one of a number of fault lines that worked to divide opinion and voters. 
Why did people vote NO? Fear of the unknown, fear of pensions being lost, fear of economic 
uncertainty, enduring commitments to a sense of Britishness and to the UK as an entity and 
also in no small part through a commitment on the part of the majority of its voters, to the 
Labour Party. 307 years of the United Kingdom means that Britishness will not disappear 
overnight and there remains some sense of attachment. Further reasons for NO voting in 
some working class areas may be found in concerns around the future of Scottish industry. 
The fear of job loss in the oil and gas industries, and in defence, for example at dockyards 
on the Clyde, and at Rosyth in Fife, which are now entirely dependent on orders from the 
Royal Navy, helped to secure the support of many Trade Unions for the NO stance of the 
Labour Party. Propaganda from company bosses about the loss of orders and or companies 
moving south will also have played a significant role in securing a NO vote among many 
workers in some of Labour’s heartlands.  
Economic position and age were crucial factors in the NO vote: the more elderly and affluent 
the voter, the more likely they were to vote NO. This is the group with perhaps the strongest 
allegiances to the post-1945 settlement and the idea – if not now the reality – of the 
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Beveridgean-Keynesian welfare state. Relatedly others were persuaded to vote NO by fears 
that Independence would undermine the remaining commitment on a UK-wide basis to some 
kind of collective welfare provision, which in turn would lead to a rapid deterioration in 
services and entitlements.  
Therefore the future of welfare entitlements and the welfare state more generally was 
deployed by both sides in the debate with YES advocating that the future of the welfare state 
was only secure with Independence and the NO campaign claiming that Independence 
would lead to an end to cross-UK transfers and therefore a decline in services. Voters were 
pulled in both directions around this issue but among the elderlyolder voters there is 
evidence that the fear of the erosion of UK-wide pensions was a significant factor in helping 
to return a NO vote from that section of the population.  
However, arguably it was also the case that the pro-Independence campaign also failed to 
use the 2008 financial crisis and the massive budget deficits which it created as an effective 
weapon against claims that Scotland could not afford to go its own way. Beyond this, the 
YES campaign failed to engage with other parts of Labour’s traditional base – and in 
particular with the Trade Unions. There was no claim to repeal anti-TU laws or to improve 
workers’ rights or generally improve working conditions. At the same time, however, such an 
approach if adopted, may only succeed in further weakening sections of the SNPs support in 
more rural areas, something that was already evident in the 2014 Referendum outcome. 
Despite the rejection of Independence, however, it was clear from the 45% who voted for 
Independence and from a significant proportion of the 55% NO voters, that all parties 
involved in the debate recognised that more powers than those to be implemented in 2016 
as a result of the Scotland Act (2012) (Scottish Parliament, 2012) are needed, even if the 
degree of further devolution has been hotly contested. During the final days of the 
Referendum campaign there was the now (in)famous ‘Vow’ (published on the front page of 
the Daily Record newspaper on September 16), from Labour, Conservative and Liberal 
parties that further powers would be considered and established within a reasonable time 
period. ‘Permanent and extensive new powers for Scotland will be delivered’ was the stated 
vow to the Scottish electorate. 
On the morning of Friday September 19, David Cameron announced the establishment of a 
commission under Lord Smith of Kelvin, to report by the end of November 2014, on 
additional powers for Scotland. However, and in another irony, the results of a Referendum 
on Scottish Independence and future powers for Scotland came to be tied to how such 
changes would impact on other countries of the UK, and in particular on England. Since then 
12 
 
the idea of English Votes for English Laws (EVEL) has become common currency in political 
debate about the future constitutional settlements of the UK as a whole. 
Nevertheless a commitment to move towards new legislation for extended powers for the 
Scottish Parliament by 2015 was a relatively clear outcome of the referendum process. It 
was clear that both YES, as well as many NO voters, were not voting for the status quo, but 
for substantial change – indeed for powers that approximate to something close to ‘devo-
max’. Gordon Brown, who played a key role in the NO campaign in its final stages, in a 
speech at Loanhead Miners Welfare Club in Midlothian on September 9, 2014, he 
announced that with a NO vote there would be cross-party agreement on new powers for 
Scotland which would be, in his own words, tantamount to ‘a modern form of Scottish home 
rule’. Days earlier in another speech he announced, seemingly with the support of David 
Cameron and Ed Miliband, ‘we are going to be within a year or two, as close to a federal 
state as you can be in a country where one nation is 85% of the population’ (Brown, 2014b). 
According to Lord Ashcroft’s on the day post-result poll, 25% of NO voters voted that way 
because they believed that Scotland would receive significant devolved powers while 
remaining as part of the UK (Ashcroft, 2014). The key visible result of this was of course the 
establishment by the UK Government, in the days following the Referendum, of the Smith 
Commission (Smith Commission, 2014) to investigate and report on the provision of 
additional devolved powers for Scotland.   This addressed not simply issues of territorial 
justice but matters such as taxation, social entitlements, state-provided services, 
financial institutions and land ownership. The development of the Smith Commission, 
its key recommendations affecting social security and housing policy and initial 
responses to them are discussed by Spicker (2014) and Gibb (2014) (this volume).    
One difficulty that now affects the main UK parties is that the Scottish Independence 
Referendum outcome, and the promise of additional powers for Scotland, has raised 
expectations that are well beyond the proposals which have emerged in the Smith 
Commission. Further, none of the main UK parties is advocating anything that comes 
remotely close to the maximum devolution. In turn, of course, plays directly into the hands of 
the SNP who have become the party, not of Independence, at least in the short term, but the 
party now campaigning to ensure that the promises made in the September ‘vow’ are fully 
implemented – that is, something approaching devolution max.  
This is now a central fault line between the pro-union and pro-independence parties in the 
post-Referendum landscape. 
Looking Ahead: Towards a Further Referendum?  
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It was widely claimed that with a NO result, the Scottish Independence Referendum would 
have ‘secured the Union for a generation’. However, relatively few would now in the 
aftermath of the Referendum put much weight on this claim, not least given the ongoing 
debates and arguments that have characterised the period after the Referendum. In the 
weeks that followed there was initially talk of a new and diverse ‘YES Alliance’ standing in 
the 2015 General Election and organised, tactical voting against Labour, but this appears to 
have fallen away. There is considerable continuing fall-out from the Referendum. 45% of 
voters cannot be ignored or dismissed. The promises made of more devolution for Scotland 
if it voted No NO by the leaders of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat Parties, 
Cameron, Miliband and Clegg, which were instrumental in securing a NO vote have, as we 
have highlighted, already caused massive political eruptions across the UK. In Scotland 
there is already growing concerns that the well-publicised vow for more powers for Scotland 
is already being diluted or delayed, as the three main UK parties squabble over the 
timetable, their respective political futures and the growing emergence of ‘the English 
question’.  
For the two main Scottish Political Parties, Labour and SNP, there are contrasting fortunes. 
Labour appear victorious, but is it a pyrrhic victory? Around 35% of Labour voters voted YES 
and it is clear that it the party has lost a lot of support in the poorer areas, mainly in its West 
of Scotland heartlands. Labour has lost members to the SNP and the irony is that in saving 
the Union (for now?), and therefore enhancing its chances of winning the 2015 General 
Election, at the same time it might have irrevocably damaged its position in those very 
heartlands, in turn eroding its chances in 2015. By contrast the SNP’s membership has 
boomed since September 18, from 25,000 to around 100,000 members, making it the third 
largest political party in the UK. It remains the most popular party in Scotland. An opinion poll 
at the end of October by Ipsos MORI on 2015 UK General Election voting intentions had the 
SNP on 52%, with a 29% gap over Labour on 23%, Conservatives on 10% and Greens and 
Liberal Democrats on 5% each. The Independence Referendum outcome, therefore, can be 
seen as having sharply contradicting longer term implications for the Labour Party.  
In early November 2014 several opinion polls reflected this ongoing fall-out from the 
Referendum. In an IpsosMori poll (November 3, 2014), 66% of people in Scotland support 
having another referendum within the next ten years regardless of circumstances; 58% 
support having another referendum vote in the next five years; 55% support another 
referendum if the UK votes to leave the EU in 2017, and this has already been demanded by 
the new First Minister, and SNP leader, Nicola Sturgeon.  
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It is now commonly accepted wisdom that devolution was and is not a one-off event taking 
place in 1999, but a long process of gradual change. That more powers have already come 
to Scotland since 1999 reflects this (and more are due in 2016 under the 2012 Scotland Act 
which provides some additional powers around taxation, for example (see Scottish 
Parliament, 2012)). Reflecting on this and on the outcome of the 2014 Independence 
Referendum, perhaps a similar argument that Independence is not a one-off event either, 
but a longer process would hold water. For some commentators, as well as for many who 
are flocking to the pro-YES parties, the 2014 Independence Referendum will mark but only 
the first stage in this historic process.  
However, the Scottish Independence Referendum has also re-ignited other though 
interconnected debates about the UK’s territorial arrangements. There are different 
dynamics and emerging, renewed tensions, contradictions and ambivalences. In all of this 
social welfare issues are pivotal in that they point to and are utilised in claims about the fair 
or unfair distribution of resources across the pluri-national UK. These issues are 
destabilising the UK union in ways that have not been seen before.  
Scotland is, despite the NO vote, a very different place post-Independence Referendum. The 
nature of that difference is working out in ways that had perhaps not been foreseen. The 
future is perhaps now even more uncertain than that which would have been provided by a 
clear YES mandate for Independence. The demand for change remains high – and, as yet, 
unmet. Scotland and the rest of the UK are in a period of transition – which will see new 
ruptures and tensions during the 2015 UK General Election. 
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